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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuB PRoCBss-UsB OP ExmANBous EvmBNCB IN

C!uMINAL SBNTBNCB-Petitioner was convicted of murder in the
first degree with a recommendation for life imprisonment. In reliance on police
and probation reports1 showing petitioner's background which included over
thirty burglaries for which he had never been arraigned and a "morbid sexuality,"
the trial judge disregarded the jury's· recommendation and imposed the death
sentence. 2 Although petitioner did not have an opportunity to examine the
reports prior to the sentence hearing, he was represented by counsel at the hearing and did not challenge them at that time. Petitioner contended that he had
been denied due process of law because his sentence had not been based on information supplied by witnesses with whom he could be confronted. Held, due
process was not violated because extraneous evidence was used to assist the
judge in imposing sentence. Justices Murphy and Rutledge dissented. Williams
v. People of State of New York, (U.S. 1949) 69 S.Ct. 1079.

DBTBRMINING

1 "Before rendering judgment or pronouncing sentence the court shall cause the defendant's previous criminal record to be submitted to it, including any reports that may have been
made as a result of a mental, phychiatric [sic] or physical examination of such person, and
may seek any information that will aid the court in determining the proper treatment of
such defendant." N.Y. Crim. Code (McKinney, 1945) §482.
2 "A jury finding a person guilty of murder in the first degree ••• may, as a part of its
verdict, recommend that the defendant be imprisoned for the term of his natural life. Upon
such recommendation, the court may sentence the defendant to imprisonment for the term
of his natural life." N.Y. Penal Law (McKinney, 1945) §1045-a. The court may disregard
the jury's recommendation. People v. Cole, 285 N.Y. 838, 35 N.E. (2d) 503 (1941).
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With the change in the emphasis of criminal prosecutions from retribution
to reformation and rehabilitation, criminal sentences have been designed to fit
the individual rather than the crime.3 At common law it was the function of the
court to sentence, the jury simply returning the verdict. The court could, how·
ever, hear additional evidence before imposing sentence.4 The power to sentence
is often vested in the jury by statute, and some confusion has arisen as to the
admissibility of evidence at the sentencing stage because of the failure to dis·
tinguish between the function of determining guilt or innocence and that of
sentencing.5 Rules of evidence are carefully designed to exclude the accused's
past from the jury because of the undue prejudice, unfair surprise and collateral
issues involved;6 but this policy does not apply at the sentencing stage, and the
sentencer may consider extraneous evidence inadmissible at the trial. 7 Therefore,
whatever limitations are imposed upon the use of extraneous evidence in imposing sentence must be derived from constitutional, and not evidentiary, prin·
ciples. In the state courts the use of extraneous evidence at sentence hearings
has withstood constitutional attacks. While a few courts have indicated that a
fair hearing must be granted to the person convicted,8 the primary ground for
upholding the statutes is that the issue of the criminal's guilt or innocence is not
affected by them. 9 Under the federal Constitution it is well settled that pro3 See Warner and Cabot, "Changes in the Administration of Criminal Justice in the Past
Fifty Years," 50 HARV. L. REv. 583 (1937); Reform in Federal Penal Procedure, 53 YALE
L. J. 773 (1944).
4Rex v. Wilson, 4 T.R. 487, 100 Eng. Rep. 1134 (1791); Rex v. Bunts, 2 T.R. 683,
100 Eng. Rep. 368 (1788); Fields v. State, 47 Ala. 603 (1872).
5 People v. Corry, 349 ill. 122, 181 N.E. 603 (1932); Reppin v. People, 95 Colo. 192,
34 P. (2d) 71 (1934). Cf. People v. Popescue, 345 ill. 142, 177 N.E. 739 (1931); and see
77 A.L.R. 1199 (1932); 86 A.L.R. 828 (1933).
6 Certain exceptions exist; where there is a question of motive, identity, mistake, acci·
dent, common scheme, or knowledge, courts allow evidence of defendant's past conduct to
be admitted. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§300 et seq. (1940). Such evidence is also
admissible to impeach defendant as a witness. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §889 (1940).
7 "It is as much for the protection of the accused as it is for the People that after the
question of guilt has been admitted by a plea or reached by a verdict the judge should know
something of the life, family, occupation and record of the person about to be sentenced."
People v. Popescue, 345 ill. 142 at 152, 177 N.E. 739 (1931). See State v. Summers, 98
N.C. 542, 4 S.E. 120 (1887). Often this is a matter of trial court discretion. State v. Ven·
mun, 149 Wash. 670, 272 P. 62 (1928). A few courts limit such evidence to that obtained
from \vitnesses in open court. People v. Giles, 70 Cal. App. (2d) (Supp.) 872, 161 P. (2d)
623 (1945); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 348 Pa. 349, 35 A. (2d) 312 (1944).
.
8 "It would be so clearly contrary to our fundamental law to permit evidence to be introduced and considered against a person convicted or accused •.. in the absence of the person
convicted, that we cannot think the Legislature contemplated such a thing." Matter of
Fowler, 49 Mich. 234 at 238, 13 N.W. 530 (1882). See also State v. Harvey, 128 S.C. 447,
123 S.E. 201 (1924). Cf. Commonwealth v. Polens, 327 Pa. 554, 194 A. 652 (1937);
Commonwealth v. Johnson, supra, note 7, 43 MxcH. L. REv. 216 (1944).
9 "Any person indicted stands before the bar of justice clothed with a presumption of
innocence and, as such, is tenderly regarded by the law. Every safeguard is thrown about
him ...• After a plea of guilty admitted murderers are in a much different position. As such
they are felons .... they are naked criminals, hoping for mercy but entitled only to justice."
People v. Riley, 376 ill. 364 at 368, 33 N.E. (2d) 872 (1941), cert. den., 313 U.S. 586, 61
S.Ct. 1118 (1941). See also State v. Reeder, 79 S.C. 139, 60 S.E. 434 (1908).
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cedural due process includes at least the right to a fair hearing, including the
right to cross-examine witnesses and reasonable notice of the charges;10 but the
principal case is the first to raise directly the question of due process at the sentence hearing under the federal Constitution. The Court, in holding due process
observed, relied upon the fact that petitioner was present, with counsel, at the
hearing and that he made no objection to the evidence at that time.11 The reasoning of the state courts and the desirability of using extrinsic evidence in
sentencing apparently influenced the majority. The dissent evidently would
exclude such extraneous evidence in capital cases, or at least subject it to the
criminal's examination before the hearing.12 However, petitioner's contentions
lose much of their force when it is considered that had the trial judge based
his sentence on petitioner's trial mannerisms or other capricious and arbitrary
factors, instead of the records actually used, the question in the principal case
would not have arisen. There is no doubt that the instant decision renders effective the discretionary and indeterminate types of sentences.

Colvin A. Peterson, Jr., S.Ed.

10 "A person's right to reasonable notice 0£ a charge against him, and an opportunity to
be heard in his defense-a right to his day in court-are basic in our system of jurisprudence;
and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer
testimony, and to be represented by counsel." In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 at 273, 68 S.Ct. 499
(1947).
11 Principal case at 1081 et seq.
12 Principal case at 1087. See 49 CoL. L. REv. 567 (1949) for a report of the case at
the trial stage, King's County Court, New York, Mar. 3, 1948, unreported; affd. 298 N.Y.
803, 83 N.E. (2d) 698 (1949).

